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Dennis J. Fixler and Kimberly D. Zieschang 
“The distinctive function of the banker-says  Ricardo, begins as soon as he 
uses the money of others.”’ Indeed this aspect of banking lies at the founda- 
tion of  the difficulties encountered in measuring bank output. Broadly speak- 
ing, such output consists of transactions (payments) services and the portfolio 
management services that banks provide to depositors while acting as their 
intermediary. There is no consensus in the banking literature on how to mea- 
sure these services. 
In this paper, we focus on the measurement of bank financial services aris- 
ing from deposit products, securities, loans, and other financial services such 
as corporate payments services and trust services. Two measurement ques- 
tions immediately arise: (1) Is the financial services output represented by the 
volume of transactions or the volume of  money in the various products? and 
(2) Which products should be considered part of  the output set? It  is now 
generally recognized that the answer to the first question is that both dimen- 
sions are important.2 The second question chiefly concerns the treatment of 
deposits. Because deposits are an input into the acquisition of earning assets, 
many argue that they should be treated as such. However, some argue that 
people purchase deposit accounts for the services of record keeping and safe- 
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keeping and that these services make deposit products outputs.  A complicat- 
ing feature of the argument is that some of the services purchased by deposi- 
tors are typically  not paid  for explicitly.  A bank  recovers  the cost of these 
services by setting a loan rate greater than the deposit rate. 
The absence of an explicit price for many of the financial services attached 
to deposit products also complicates the measurement of financial services in 
the national income and product accounts. Specifically, the absence of an ex- 
plicit payment has made it impossible to determine the value of these services, 
and so national  income accountants must  impute their value.  Although  the 
proper imputation  has been the subject of a long debate, it has recently be- 
come more topical with the rise in the international trade in financial  service^.^ 
Fixler  (1988) sets out how  the  financial model  we use  addresses  output 
measurement  and the preponderance  of  implicit prices.  Briefly, all financial 
services are a part of the output set. Financial services are assumed to attach 
to each dollar in a financial product at a point in time. Variables such as the 
number of transactions  are viewed as quality variables of  the attached finan- 
cial services bundle.  The price of the attached bundle of financial services is 
characterized as the user cost of money associated with the product, a concept 
developed by Donovan (1978) and Bamett (1978, 1980) and applied to finan- 
cial firms in Hancock (1985b, 1986). The fundamental components of a user 
cost price are an interest rate, a capital gains rate, and an opportunity cost of 
money or benchmark rate. Given the user cost prices of  financial products, 
banks maximize variable economic profit conditioned on physical capital, la- 
bor, purchased materials and services, and technology. 
The research we report in this paper is part of a program to develop a con- 
ceptual framework for a financial services component for the producer price 
index. Given  the financial firm model  for  price measurement  developed  in 
Fixler  (1988), this  program  addresses four questions defining  areas of  re- 
search relevant  to  the  construction and applicability  of  a financial  services 
output price index: (1) For what nominal sales aggregate could such an index 
be used as a deflator, and how does the financial firm model relate to concepts 
underlying  the national  income accounts for nominal  sales of  financial  ser- 
vices? (2)  On the basis of available data and given the current national income 
accounting conventions, what would the implications of such a price index be 
for financial services price and output over a recent period? (3) How would 
available quality  of  service  attributes  be  incorporated  into  the user  cost of 
money measurement  framework? and (4) How good are the accounting rules 
of thumb as estimators of the opportunity cost of funds compared with a struc- 
tural,  econometric estimate, and what are the implications  for the resulting 
financial services output measure? 
3. In fact, the United Nations  Statistical Office (UNSO) is in  the process of  revising their 
imputation of financial services. Our discussion of the UNSO approach below refers to the pro- 
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Fixler and Zieschang (1  99  1) addressed question 1. After reviewing past and 
present national income accounting  treatments for financial services,  it was 
shown that the financial firm model rationalizes the accounting methodology 
used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and an alternative method- 
ology proposed by  the  United  Nations  Statistical Office (UNSO).  Each  ac- 
counting framework was shown to impute uncharged financial services on the 
basis of its own assumption about the opportunity cost of money. In the BEA 
framework, the opportunity cost rate was shown to be the interest rate charged 
on loans; in the UNSO framework the opportunity cost rate was shown to be 
a simple average of the rate charged on loans and paid on deposits. Because 
the  construction  of  a financial  services output price index compatible with 
each accounting methodology depends on the assumed opportunity cost,  an 
empirical assessment of these assumptions was deemed necessary. 
To address question 2, Fixler and Zieschang (1990) expanded on work be- 
gun in  1989 to compute price and quantity indexes for large banks based on 
data  from the  Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC) for the years 
1984-88.  The paper also developed independent estimates of the capital gains 
component of the user cost prices.  Use was made of results from Fixler and 
Zieschang (1991) on the opportunity cost of money assumptions underlying 
the BEA and UNSO accounting schemes to compute the user cost prices of 
monetary  goods and their associated sales weights in Tornqvist price index 
formulas. The indexes considered were therefore designed to be compatible 
with  the existing  and proposed  accounting treatments of financial services. 
The patterns  and  levels  of  price  change  found  under  the  two  imputation 
schemes  were  generally  similar, and the  output  growth  for the  period  was 
found to be approximately 40 percent, with the BEA opportunity cost rate. 
To address question 3, Fixler and Zieschang (1992) conducted a study of 
the use of bank branches as correlates of or proxies for the quality of financial 
services delivered, again making use of FDIC data. In that paper, a technique 
was introduced for using hedonic estimates of the prices of characteristics (the 
numbers of six types of  branches operated by a bank) to construct an exact 
quality adjustment to a superlative productivity index. The technique was in- 
spired by earlier theoretical work on quality-adjusted superlative price indexes 
by Zieschang (1985,  1988) and adapted to the financial services price mea- 
surement context by Fixler (1988). The quality-adjustment method was then 
demonstrated by  constructing  depositor services and labor quality modifiers 
for  multifactor  productivity  indexes  for  large  banks.  The adjustment  was 
modest given the narrow focus on a single product and a single input, increas- 
ing the productivity index level by approximately 0.6 percent at the end of the 
1984-88  period. 
In the present paper, which addresses question 4, we characterize a bank’s 
production  of portfolio  and payment  services in a distance function frame- 
work. From standard duality results, we derive the opportunity cost of money 
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and the attending product shares are then used to estimate the shadow value of 
the opportunity  cost of  capital for the bank. Using  FDIC data for approxi- 
mately 480 banks with assets over $300 million in the years  1984-1988,  we 
find that in any given year the resulting value of the econometric opportunity 
cost rate differs noticeably from the opportunity cost rates underlying the BEA 
and UNSO frameworks. Our estimated value of the opportunity cost rate also 
significantly differs from the 90-day Treasury Bill rate in three of the five years 
considered. The Treasury Bill rate is another commonsense value of  the op- 
portunity cost rate inasmuch as it is a short-term, risk-free rate readily avail- 
able to banks. Using the estimated value of the opportunity cost rate, we con- 
struct price and quantity  indexes.  Fortunately for price-  and quantity-index 
construction,  we find that the Tomqvist output quantity index and its asso- 
ciated  implicit price index are not sensitive to the opportunity cost estimate 
used;  output growth  was found to be  approximately 40  percent; prices  de- 
clined by approximately 4 percent.  However, the insensitivity of index num- 
bers to the opportunity cost estimate may not carry over to the imputations in 
the national  income accounts. In Fixler and Zieschang (1991) we found that 
the level of the opportunity cost rate affects the imputed value of sector sales 
and thereby  may  have  a significant effect on the  division of  gross  sales of 
financial services between intermediate and final consumers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 6.1 
provides a detailed discussion of the output and price measurement concepts 
underlying the financial firm model. Section 6.2 sets out the distance function 
and section 6.3 its econometric estimation. Section 6.4 describes our data and 
our results. Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.1  Bank Output and Prices 
Financial services output primarily stems from the role of financial institu- 
tions as “users of the money of others.” This role is greatly affected by two 
features of their environment: the existence of imperfect capital markets and 
the set of regulations designed to minimize the probability of bank failure and 
control the money supply. Of special importance to the latter is the fractional 
reserve system. 
By capital market imperfections we mean the information asymmetries be- 
tween  lenders  (depositors)  and  borrowers  and  the  existence  of  substantial 
transaction costs for depositors to discover information about potential bor- 
rowers and to specify the loan contract. It is a bank’s ability to reduce both the 
informational asymmetry and the attending transaction costs that is crucial to 
its role as an intermediary.  Goodhart (1989) argues that, because banks pro- 
vide information and lower transactions costs, as well as hold inventories of 
financial instruments, they act as market makers for money. 
But a bank’s behavior as an intermediary  is substantially limited by bank 
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checkable deposits. Deposits cannot be used to acquire equity nor can they be 
used to underwrite new issues. The imposition of capital requirements limits 
the returns to a bank’s stockholders. Perhaps the most significant restriction is 
the reserve requirement on deposits. This “tax” further limits the return that 
banks earn on their deposits, and, as shown by Barnett, Hinich, and Weber 
(1986), it is substantial: approximately $10 billion in the early to mid-1980s. 
The fact that the required reserve rate is less than  100 percent complicates 
modeling the role of deposits in a bank. 
In a world with a 100-percent reserve requirement, banks could not lend 
out deposits and therefore would charge explicitly for the financial services, 
such as safekeeping and record keeping, provided to  depositor^.^ But, because 
the reserve requirement is substantially less than 100 percent (approximately 
12 percent for large bank demand deposit accounts and 3 percent for nonper- 
sonal time deposit accounts), banks can lend most of  their deposits. Thus a 
bank provides an intermediary portfolio service to depositors, in addition to 
record keeping and safekeeping, that produces a profit that can in turn finance 
interest payments to depositors or subsidize the costs of the services provided 
to them. Deposits are therefore simultaneously an input into the loan process 
and an output, in the sense that they are purchased as a final product providing 
financial services. Viewed in this way it is not surprising that the classification 
of  deposits as an input or an output has sparked so much debate in the bank 
literature. It is also clear why it is difficult to price the financial services sold 
to depositors. 
The financial firm model we use focuses on banks as producers of financial 
services. The financial services are attached to each dollar in the various finan- 
cial products offered by a bank and are therefore measured in monetary units. 
All financial products are viewed as providing financial services and are pro- 
duced by  employing (physical) capital, labor, and purchased materials and 
services. But to simply say that all financial services are output is not suffi- 
cient to model bank behavior. One must also be concerned with the role of the 
financial products in the operations of banks; principally, the role of deposits 
as the raw material used to make loans and acquire other earning assets. To 
capture this intermediary aspect of bank behavior, it is necessary to assign a 
financial input or output status to each financial pr~duct.~  It  is important to 
keep in mind that this status reflects only the role of the product in the finan- 
cial operations of the bank; the financial services output is the output being 
measured. A product is a financial output when its economic return is positive 
4. Intermediation would also not take place if the interest rate paid to  depositors were equal to 
the loan rate and the reserve requirement were less than  I00  percent. 
5. There is a considerable debate in the literature (and in  this conference) about the input- 
output status of deposits. In  our framework, the financial services attached to  deposit products 
(inclusive of the intermediary service) are always considered an output. At the same time, deposits 
are allowed to act as an  input to loan production; in fact, as shown below, the  user-cost method 
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and a financial input when its economic return is negative.  As is explained 
below, these  designations are not  permanent  in the financial  firm model, a 
flexibility that allows bank behavior to adjust to financial market conditions. 
Financial products are essentially a bundle of financial services specified by 
a contract.  The contract between depositors and the bank is standard.  Fixed 
nominal values are deposited, and the bank promises to make them available 
on demand. That is, the provision of  services like record keeping and safe- 
keeping do not impinge on liquidity. Product characteristics,  such as allowed 
checks per month, determine the quality of the financial services provided. 
Measures of  activity,  such as number  of  accounts  and transactions  per  ac- 
count, can also be viewed as quality factors in this framework. 
Loan contracts are more variable. Banks not only vary the loan contract by 
type  of  borrower,  for example,  between  commercial  and  noncommercial 
ones, but also within a type according to credit risk and perhaps size of loan. 
Another feature of loan contracts is that the interest rate charged by the bank 
may not reflect the actual cost of  the loan. Banks may require a borrower to 
keep a compensating balance in a deposit  account  or bundle  the loan with 
some payment services, for example, becoming the issuer of dividend checks. 
Because these arrangements involve an implicit price for the loan service pro- 
vided, we encounter the same problem as the one discussed above for deposit 
services. 
To model fully the effect of such features as compensating balances and like 
factors affecting the implicit payment for services, we ideally want to augment 
the financial service bundle attached to each dollar in a product by a vector of 
product  characteristics  that captures the particulars  of  the contract between 
the bank and the depositor or borrower.6 Such detailed characteristics infor- 
mation, however, is unavailable in our data set. But the data set does contain 
the number of bank branches, and we use this variable to ascertain the impor- 
tance of the convenience of service characteristic. 
Our financial services prices are the user cost of money rates per dollar in a 
financial product.  The user cost of  a financial product is an appropriate char- 
acterization of  the financial services price because it measures the economic 
return to the bank for providing the financial service. The form of a product’s 
user cost depends on its asset/liability  status. The user cost for the ith asset 
financial product in period t for a particular bank is given by 
where p is the bank’s opportunity cost of capital and hot is the holding revenue 
rate obtained from the ith asset, which is given by h;, = interest rate received 
6.  Fixler (1988) shows how a full treatment of product characteristics would be incorporated in 
the quantity index given later. That analysis further shows how, by adjusting changes in the price 
of  the financial services for changes in product characteristics, the price index effectively synthe- 
sizes the nominal and activity-based characterizations of  banking services. 225  User Costs and the Real Output of Banks 
+ capital gain rate - provision for loan losses. The user cost for the ith 
liability financial product is given by 
where  h,,  denotes the holding cost rate  of  the  ith  liability product and  is 
given by  h;, = interest rate paid -  service fees + p X  reserve requirement.’ 
The last term represents the reserve tax. 
The sign of  the user cost allows one to distinguish products as finuncial 
inputs and outputs. If the user cost is negative, then the product is a financial 
output, because it contributes to revenue, and, if the user cost is positive, then 
the product is a financial input. The user-cost approach’s endogenous catego- 
rization of products as financial inputs and outputs is significant because of 
the extensive debate in the bank literature about the proper status of financial 
products. 
The user cost expressions include the return to intermediation, the imputa- 
tion for the uncharged-for financial service, as part of the price for the finan- 
cial service. To  see this, suppose that the holding cost for a deposit product 
was  simply the interest rate paid less the per dollar service fee charged and 
that the opportunity cost of money was simply the loan rate. Using (2) above 
the user cost for the deposit product can be written as -  [(loan rate -  interest 
rate paid) + service fee]. 
If the loan rate were equal to the interest rate paid, then the value of  the 
services provided would simply be the explicit service fee charged. If instead 
the  loan  rate  were  greater than  the interest paid  to  depositors-the  usual 
case-then  the value of the financial services would be the implicit payment, 
represented by  the difference in  the interest rates,  plus the explicit service 
charge. A similar interpretation applies to the user cost of asset products. 
The above user cost expressions reveal the importance of  p in determining 
the price of  the financial services bundle: it represents the opportunity cost of 
money to the bank from the perspective of  the next best alternative use, in 
contrast to the typical  opportunity cost of  capital in the  finance literature, 
which focuses on the cost of capital as determined from its sources.8 
The unobservability of p is a hurdle that must be overcome in implementing 
the financial firm model. As mentioned at the outset there are some common- 
sense candidates for p that are used by  BEA and UNSO. In this paper we 
derive p from a model of  the bank’s technology and estimate it using FDIC 
data. 
Our derivation of  p relies on the parts of  the bank technology concerned 
with making loans and purchasing securities. This use perspective reflects the 
7. Bamett (1980) and Hancock (1985b) derive these equations. To  simplify the  analysis, we 
8. See, e.g.,  Van Home (1983). 
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portfolio behavior of the bank, in particular the uses of the money obtained 
through deposits or otherwise borrowed. In banking, such portfolio decisions 
entail duration matching whereby short-term sources of money are matched 
with  short-term  uses,  and  so  on,  and  balancing  the  volume  of  interest- 
sensitive assets with the volume of  interest-sensitive liabilities to minimize 
the effect of interest rate risk on net worth.9 
Bank models are unavoidably limited by  the difficulties inherent in model- 
ing the nuances of portfolio management, especially when dealing with large, 
complex, multiproduct banks such as the ones in our sample. We  capture the 
portfolio management features, to some extent, by separately considering four 
loan categories and two security categories. The loan categories are loans se- 
cured by real estate, commercial and industrial loans, loans to individuals and 
credit card loans,  and a catchall category-all  other loans and leases. The 
security categories are securities backed by the U.S. government and a catch- 
all, all other securities. The all-other-securities category includes such items 
as state and local government securities, federal funds sold, repurchase agree- 
ments, and foreign securities. Loans are typically long-term with fixed inter- 
est rates and no secondary market in which to trade them; securities have a 
well-developed secondary market that permit trades to counter interest rate 
risk. By isolating these products in our estimation of p, we allow for product- 
specific portfolio considerations to affect our estimate of p. 
We  seek a representative p that can serve in the construction of  industry 
output and price indexes. To be acceptable, the representative p should not 
only reflect bank attitudes toward risk and maturity but also serve as an indus- 
try aggregate of the bank-specific portfolio assembly process. The value of  p 
for each bank is taken as some proportion of  its return on assets, and that 
proportion is assumed to be the same for all banks. Thus by estimating the 
proportion, we obtain an industry representative p, and by  applying the pro- 
portion to each bank’s return on assets we obtain the distribution of bank spe- 
cifics p’s. 
6.2  The Bank Production Model 
Like Hancock (1985b), we  view banking firms as transforming the nonfi- 
nancial inputs capital, labor, and purchased materials and services into finan- 
cial products. Our list of nonfinancial inputs is x, = number of employees and 
officers; x2 = premises and fixes assets, in dollars; and xg  = purchased mate- 
rials and services, in dollars. The bank produces the following financial prod- 
ucts: y, = loans secured by real estate; y2 = commercial and industrial loans; 
y3 = loans to individuals, including credit cards; y4 = other loans, and leases; 
ys = federal funds purchased, and federal government securities and federal 
9. Duration refers to the average time needed to recover the initial investment. It is in effect a 
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agency obligations; y, = obligations of states and political subdivisions, and 
foreign and other securities; y, = fiduciary activities, fees, and other nonin- 
terest income; and ys = interest and non-interest-bearing domestic and for- 
eign deposits, federal funds sold, and Treasury demand notes.Io  All are mea- 
sured  in  dollars.  These  yi will  be  designated  financial  inputs or  outputs 
according to the sign of their user cost. 
Ideally, we would also include a vector of characteristics, say given by the 
letter a,  describing the services provided. Our data, however, only allows us 
to include branching as a proxy for service attributes such as convenience. 
The  FDIC  call  report  data  contains the  number  of  six  different types of 
branches operated by banks. In Fixler and Zieschang (1992) we examined the 
use of this branch information as quality indicators. There, we  made use of 
hedonic equations relating service charge rates and the average salary of  offi- 
cers and employees to the branching variables to compute a quality-corrected 
multifactor productivity index, using a method of incorporating hedonic esti- 
mates into exact and superlative index numbers. We found certain branch var- 
iables to be significant in explaining cross-sectional interest-rate variation. We 
also found that branching had  a mildly positive effect on banking industry 
output and productivity over time. Consequently, we include a branching var- 
iable in the current structural estimation context. 
We characterize the bank's production technology as 
D (x, a,  y) = 1, 
where the function D is the output distance function, defined as 
(3)  D (x, a, y) = [max (8 : (x,  a, 8 y) E T}I-l, 
and T is the banking firm's technology set. D thus represents the reciprocal of 
the factor 0 that scales the output vector y = (yl,  y2,  y3,  y4,  ys,  y,,  y,, y,)  with 
characteristic a so that 8y is just producible with inputs x = (xl,  x,,  x3), where 
a = number of branches in the bank's domestic offices. It can be used to form 
the more familiar joint-production function 
f(x, a,  y) = D (x,  a, y) - 1 = 0. 
The distance function appeared in economics in the early 1950s in works 
by Debreu (1951), Shephard (1953, 1970), and Malmquist (1953). It has seen 
extensive, if often implicit, application in the economics and operations re- 
search literature on  measuring  technical  efficiency  beginning  with  Farrell 
(1957)."  Malmquist (1953) and Moorsteen (1961) related the distance func- 
10.  In previous work, we found a difference in the classification of large certificates of  deposit, 
domestic interest-bearing deposits, foreign interest-bearing deposits and non-interest-bearing de- 
posits. The structural model developed below results in a system of asset share equations. Asset 
detail was therefore deemed more important than liability detail, and depositlike funds were com- 
bined to reduce the number of unknown parameters in the model. 
11.  For recent studies of cost efficiency in banking, see Femer and Love11 (19%)  and Berger 
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tion to the theory of economic quantity indexes, and Caves, Christensen, and 
Diewert (1982) have related it to indexes of multifactor productivity. In gen- 
eral, D  is linear homogeneous in y and nonincreasing in a scalar multiple of 
x. Other  properties  often  assumed  for D  include convexity  and  increasing 
monotonicity in y,  and quasi concavity and decreasing monotonicity in x. 
Shephard (1970) showed that when D  is convex and increasing in y,  it is 
dual to the revenue function, defined 
T  (x, a, p) = max, { pry  :  (x, a, y) E T); 
that is, D and T  can be derived from one another as 
D (x,  a,  y) = max,  {p’y : ~(x,  a, p) 5  1) 
and 
~(x,  a, p) = max, { p’y :  D(x,  a, y) 5  11, 
where p is a vector of known nonzero, nonnegative prices. If one of the out- 
puts y is actually an input, with Vy,  D <  0 and Vp,n <  0, then T  can be reinter- 
preted as a restricted profit function (see, e.g., McFadden 1978). 
Hancock  (1985a,  1985b, 1986) used  the  restricted  profit function in  her 
studies of bank technology, focusing on the interest-rate and substitution elas- 
ticities of  financial products.  She estimated the holding revenue (cost) com- 
ponents of the user cost prices of financial products from interest rates, real- 
ized  capital  gains, insurance  fees, and  loss-provision  data.  The remaining 
component, the opportunity cost rate of money, was determined by reasoning 
that the opportunity cost must not be any higher than  the maximum  rate at 
which no bank in her sample would earn an economic loss. 
In this  study, we are interested in developing and evaluating methods for 
price measurement and deflation of  bank revenue to obtain a measure of bank 
output.  Accordingly,  we  want  to  estimate  the  shadow prices  of  monetary 
goods, and we approach the problem of modeling bank technology  from the 
primal, instead of the dual, side. We pose a shadow price problem because we 
want to infer the opportunity cost of money, a key component of the user cost 
expressions, directly from bank behavior using econometric methods.  Iz 
The system of  output  shadow price equations (up to a proportional con- 
stant) is given by the gradient of D with respect  to y,  assuming that the dis- 
tance function is differentiable  in y.  Formally, the shadow price vector p* is 
given by p* = VP(x,  y), which is the obverse of the better-known Shephard- 
Hotelling lemma yielding the vector of revenue-maximizing outputs as y* = 
V,T(X, p). We estimate the (conditional) distance function and its gradients, 
from which we obtain  the shadow prices of loans and leases, y,, . . . ,  y,, 
12. Our econometric approach implements the Fire and Zieschang (1991) suggestion that the 
shadow price equations can be useful for determining the prices of  nonmarketed commodities 
produced by  nonprofit organizations, or in any situation where market prices are either absent or 
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securities, y, and y6,  other services, y,, and deposits, y,.  Using the expressions 
from Barnett (1980), Hancock (1985b), and Fixler (1988) to express the user 
cost of money prices of financial goods, and with knowledge of loan, security, 
and deposit interest rates, the securities appreciation rate, and the rate of pro- 
vision for loan losses, we determine the opportunity cost rate, p. We  compare 
this econometric estimate against the estimates implicit in the current and pro- 
posed national income accounting imputation methods, and other common- 
sense rates that might be used as opportunity cost estimates. 
Our econometric model uses what we will call a conditional distance func- 
tion. This distance function is conditioned on the level of deposits, y,,  and is 
defined by 
(4) 
where 3,  refers to all elements of the output vector y except deposits, y,. The 
deposits conditional distance function Dc  is linear homogeneous in 3, by defi- 
nition. Inasmuch as we  use accounting data, we  use this function because 
deposits and  other  liabilities are accounting inputs,  a use  of  funds,  even 
though they may be a source of  financial services output. We show below that 
our representation of the production technology yields a system in which the 
accounting shares of  individual asset and fee income in total asset and fee 
income are functions of the shares of  individual assets in the asset portfolio 
and  other variables. We  hold that,  from an  econometric point of  view,  the 
gross revenue share system generated by  the deposits conditional distance 
function in equation (4) is better posed than the net revenue share system that 
would be generated by the unconditional distance function in equation (3).  I3 
6.2.1 
As discussed in section 6.1 above, the assumption of a constant opportunity 
cost rate across banks may be too restrictive in our sample of banks from the 
FDIC data set, which is heterogeneous and large by comparison with the Fed- 
eral Reserve functional cost analysis survey data set used by  Hancock. We 
therefore model the opportunity cost rate as a constant proportion of  a bank’s 
return on assets. This specification is appealing because banks with unusually 
high asset yields are likely to have concentrations of assets in relatively risky 
categories. Setting the opportunity cost rate as a fraction of return on assets 
Modeling the Opportunity Cost Rate 
13. We  show below that the deposits-conditional output distance function generates a system 
of equations that relate the shares of asset receipts in total asset income to the corresponding asset 
portfolio shares, and the vector of arguments of the conditional distance function. By analogy, it 
can also be shown that the “unconditional”  distance  function generates  a system relating the 
“shares” of (positive) asset receipts and (negative) deposit payments in net asset income, to the 
corresponding net asset portfolio shares and the vector of  arguments of the distance function. We 
consider this latter system ill posed because the net asset income shares are not bounded between 
zero and one and are likely to be very sensitive to the random variation in the interest rates that are 
effectively the endogenous variables in the system, particularly disturbances that happen to drive 
net asset income near zero. We examined the net asset shares in our data and can confirm they are 
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therefore  takes  into account  variations  in  attitudes toward risk  by  manage- 
ment. 
6.3  Using the Distance Function to Estimate p 
Because we are interested in shadow prices and our data contain some price 
information, we wish to econometrically estimate the distance function with a 
system of  share equations. Fiire, Fukuyama, and Primont (1988) estimate a 
distance function along with a system of share equations in which the left- 
hand-side  variables  are computed  from known price  and quantity  data.  We 
cannot use this approach without modification,  because the unknown oppor- 
tunity cost rate is a determinant of the left-hand side of the Fare, Fukuyama, 
and Primont share system for our 
We therefore develop an alternative set of  share equations. Recall that the 
first six  products in  the bank's  production  function are products  associated 
with monetary asset stocks, the seventh is fee and services income, and the 
eighth is deposits and other liabilities.  For i  =  1, . . . , 6, the ith product 
share is 
where h, = the holding revenue rate on the ith asset; p = the opportunity cost 
rate of funds; R, = Xf=  h,y, + R, = total asset holding revenue and service 
charges; R, = income  from services produced  other than  those  associated 
with asset/liability products; A  = Cp=  y, = total assets; and w, = Vln,,  EnD,(x, 
a,  y,; 3,). This can be restated with a change of variables as 
(5) 
where w,  = h,y,/R,, the holding revenue share of  the ith product in asset in- 
come; st = y,/A, the asset portfolio share of the ith product; + = p/rTA;  and r,, 
= R,/A,  the  total  rate  of  return  on  assets,  including  (nondeposit)  service 
charge income. 
(6) 
where w,  = Vlny,  lnDc(x,  a, y,; f,). 
From  the  system  of  equations (5) and  (6) we  can form an econometric 
model of bank technology. Assuming the distance function D,  is translog, the 
economic shares w are 
W$  = 4.  s, + (1 -  4).  w,, 
For the seventh output, other services, we have 
w7  = (1 -  +I  *  w7, 
14.  Other recent studies on estimating distance functions include Fire, Grosskopf, Lindgren, 
and Roos (1989), Fire, Grosskopf, Lovell, and Yaisawarng (forthcoming), and Lovell and Zie- 
schang (1992). These papers approach the estimation problem in one of two ways: direct fitting of 
the distance function to the  data by linear programming methods, or estimation of a system of 
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(7)  w~ =  at  + yya.tlnU + ';=I  yyyglnY] + ':=I  yyx,rklmk, 
i  = 1, . . . ,  7. From the homogeneity of the distance function: 2:= ,a,  = 1, 
3. Substituting (7) into (5) and (6)  and appending an error term, we have 
X:;l=,yya,,-0,X.7=Iyyy,J=0,j=  -  1,...,8,andC~=l~yxrk=0,k=  1,2, 
wi = 4 si + pi + $ya,$nu + C/8=1  $yy,,lnyj 
+ X;=l$yx,iklmk  + E), i  = 1, . . . ,  6; 
(8) 
and 
(9)  w7  =  P7  '!',,$nu  + X~=I  JlYy.7j b',  + %=l(Gryr.7k1mk  +  E7, 
where IJ.~ = (1 -  +)  *  ai;  $p,i  = (1 -  4) . yYa,,;  J?,,/  = (1 -  4) *  Yyy,i/;  $,.x.ik 
= (1 -  4)  *  yyx,ik;  and where, again, 4 is the ratio of the opportunity cost rate 
to total return on assets for the industry. From the earlier homogeneity condi- 
tions: Cy=lp,i =  1 - 4; Z~=l$yo,i  = 0;  X7=1$yJij = 0; Z~=I$yx,ik  = 0; and 
X;=I~i  = 0. We  estimate 4 as a constant parameter that corresponds to our 
maintained assumption that the opportunity cost rate is a constant fraction of 
the total rate of return on assets. 
6.4  Data and Results 
Our data set is a subset of the FDIC reports of income and condition. The 
FDIC data consist of quarterly balance sheet and income statement call reports 
for the approximately 13,000 commercial banks that are covered by  deposit 
insurance, and we hereafter refer to it as the call reports file. We consider only 
the banks that have international  operations or assets over $300 million (FDIC 
classes FFIEC03  1 and FFIEC032). These banks file more detailed quarterly 
reports than other reporting banks and cover more than half the deposits of all 
banks in the United States. 
We  further filtered the set of  banks considered by  applying the following 
criteria: banks had  to have positive net assets, positive total  liabilities and 
positive total assets, and positive net income from interest and noninterest 
sources. This yielded a sample of more than 400 banks in each quarter for the 
period from 1984(1) to  1988(4). We  aggregated the report of condition data 
into annual averages for the years 1984-88.  The reports of  income contain 
the annual income and expense flows that match our annual average asset and 
liability data from the reports of condition. They are annually cumulative, and 
we used the reports for the last quarter within each year for which each bank 
reported data. In most cases, this was quarter 4, but some institutions disap- 
peared during each year, and the associated quarters of  data used for these 
banks ranged from 1 to 3. The account classes were initially aggregated to the 
lowest level possible for which comparable stock and flow information could 
be computed from the balance sheet and income data and then further aggre- 
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Table 6.1  Components of Financial Product Aggregates 
Aggregate  Report of 
Output Class  Income Code 
- 
Loans & leases: 
Yl  401 I 
Y2  4012 
4'3  4050* 






















Directly charged services: 
Deposits & other liabilities: 








Secured by  real estate 
Commercial & industrial 
Loans to individuals 
To depository institutions 
To farmers 
Acceptances of other banks 
To foreign governments 
Nonsecurity obligations of  states 
All other loans in domestic offices 
Loans in foreign offices & edge & agreement corporations 
Balances due from depository institutions 
Leases 
Federal funds sold & repurchase agreements 
U.S. Treasury securities and agency obligations 
Securities issued by states & political subsivisions 
Other domestic securities (debt & equity) 
Foreign securities (debt & equity) 
Securities in trading accounts 
Fiduciary activities 
Trading gains & fees from foreign exchange transactions 
Other foreign transactions gains 
Other noninterest income 
Non-interest-bearing deposits in domestic offices 
Time certificates of  deposit larger than $100,000 in 
All other deposits 
Non-interest-bedring deposits in foreign Offices 
All other deposits in foreign offices 
Federal funds purchased & repurchase agreements 
Demand notes with the U.S. Treasury 
domestic offices 
Nores: NINT and NFNT are placeholders for report of condition accounts that do not appear on the 
report of  income because they do not earn interest. Code 4050 is the sum of report of condition 
codes 4054 and 4055, which segregate credit card income from other income. The reports of 
condition contain only account values for the sum of credit card and other loans to individuals. 
*Created code. 
tains the detail of this product aggregation scheme. In table 6.2 we  report 
means of the shares of assets and charged services in asset and service charge 
income w#,  the asset portfolio shares, s,  , and sample sizes. 
6.4.1. 
Before describing the econometric aspects of estimating p, we describe the 
construction of  the holding revenues of assets and the holding costs of liabili- 
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Table 6.2  Sample Sizes and Asset-Weighted Means 
Holding Revenue and Portfolio Shares 
Data without  Data without Zeros 





























































































































































0.  I47 
0.180 
0.097 
(continued) 234  Dennis J. Fixler and Kimberly D. Zieschang 
Table 6.2  (continued) 
Data without  Data without Zeros 
Variable  All Data  Zeros  and Influentials 
s4  0.394 
s5  0.102 
S6  0.085 
N  464 
WI  0.153 
w2  0.169 
w3  0.107 
w4  0.215 
w5  0.053 
W6  0.055 
w7  0.141 
s1  0.161 
s2  0.176 
s3  0.090 
s4  0.369 
s5  0.110 
S6  0.081 
N  453 
w1  0.155 
w2  0.161 
w3  0.095 
w4  0.304 
w5  0.087 
W6  0.068 
w7  0.116 
s1  0.179 
s2  0.178 
s3  0.092 
s4  0.344 
s5  0.115 

































































Note:  W is used for asset-weighted means holding revenue; S for portfolio shares. 
ties. The holding cost and revenue components of  the various product user 
costs were constructed by item. As given earlier, the complete expression for 
the holding revenue of the ith asset is given by 
h: = interest rate received + capital gain rate 
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and the expression for the holding cost of the ith liability is given by 
h: = interest rate paid - service fees + p  x  reserve requirement.15 
To  calculate the interest rates used in the analysis, fourth-quarter income for a 
particular asset or liability product for each bank in the sample is divided by 
the annual average of the corresponding aggregate balance sheet item. Asset 
detail on loan and lease loss provisions was not available in our FDIC data. 
We  therefore allocated the available aggregate loan and lease loss provisions 
for each bank proportionately (and admittedly somewhat arbitrarily) to the 
portfolio share of each loan item in the loan and lease portfolio. Because loss 
provisions reduce taxable corporate income, we multiplied loss provisions by 
one minus the marginal tax rate (see n. 21  for the tax rates).I6  Deposit service 
charges per dollar are estimated by the ratio of total service charge income to 
the annual average of  interest and non-interest-bearing deposits in domestic 
branches, again owing to a lack of  account detail in the FDIC service charge 
data. This amount is then subtracted from the interest rates for the deposit 
products. 
We  set the capital gains term equal to zero in all holding revenue expres- 
sions for assets that are not  marketable. This leaves the following security 
categories for which a capital gain term is relevant: assets held in trading ac- 
counts; U.S. Treasury securities; U.S. government agency and corporate ob- 
ligations; state and local securities; other domestic securities (mainly mort- 
gage related and Federal Reserve stock); and foreign securities. 
Our assumption about marketable assets does not take into account the re- 
cent rise in loan sales by banks. The deregulation of banks and the attending 
rise in competition has forced banks into a position of diversifying portfolios 
by  selling loan assets in their entirety or in  parts. Consequently, secondary 
15. The holding cost for a liability product should also include a deposit insurance premium 
assessed by the FDIC. Because all banks are assessed the annual premium of  %2  of  1 percent of 
total domestic deposits, the exclusion of this term does not qualitatively affect our analysis. The 
premium term would have to be included if the premium becomes dependent on bank risk-a 
suggestion that is often voiced in the face of the rising number of bank failures. 
16.  Our approach to the tax deductibility of loan loss reserves does not take into account the 
changes in such deductions that were a part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. One of the provisions of 
the act limited loan loss reserves to actual charge offs, although banks can add to their reserves as 
much as they wish. This provision applied chiefly to banks with assets over 500 million. Further- 
more, the act required banks to recapture exisring bad debts reserves into taxable income at a set 
schedule.  Financially  troubled  banks  were relieved of  this provision until they were in  better 
condition. Because these changes occurred within the period examined, we chose to incorporate 
a uniform treatment of loan loss reserves. 
17. Although foreign securities earn capital gains, we did not consider these capital gains be- 
cause the data were unavailable.  Assets in trading accounts are typically held for only a short 
period of time, so capital gains income is likely to be fully realized. Realized gains in trading 
accounts from the call reports is thus used for the capital gains term in our user cost estimates for 
trading accounts.  The capital gain for commercial real estate loans is set equal to zero because 
these loans are not typically traded, although an informal secondary market is beginning to form 
among the money center banks. Residential mortgages, on the other hand, are routinely securi- 
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markets for commercial and industrial loans, albeit informal, have arisen al- 
though the volume of such transactions  is small.18 Recently, the financing of 
leveraged buy outs has been inextricably tied to the ability of the lead lending 
banks to sell pieces of  loans. At some banks, the salability of a loan has be- 
come as important as the borrower's credit worthiness.'g 
We approximate the effect of capital gains for Treasury securities and U.S. 
government  agency and corporate obligations by  subtracting the  computed 
sample  average  interest  rate  on Treasury  securities  and  agency  obligations 
from the average annual total return data, which are the sum of  the market 
interest rate and the rate of capital appreciation, obtained from the Merrill- 
Lynch government master bond index.20 This index includes various maturi- 
ties of Treasury securities and U.S. agency securities. 
The capital gains term for government securities other than Treasury secu- 
rities was approximated by subtracting the computed sample average interest 
rate on government securities from the total return on these securities obtained 
from the Merrill-Lynch mortgage master index. Although this set of securities 
is not  solely composed of  mortgage-backed  securities,  all securities in this 
category were imputed with the mortgage master total return rate. 
The capital gains on state and local securities are difficult to measure be- 
cause the major indexes are not total return indexes, but rather simple aver- 
ages of dealer estimates of what the coupon rate would have to be for a partic- 
ular  issue  released  on the  day of  the survey  and  sold  at  par.  To  measure 
changes in the total return to holding state and municipal securities we exam- 
ined the Lipper index for the performance of a collection of tax-exempt mu- 
tual funds.21  A potential problem with this measure is the variability in man- 
agement performance  inherent  in  a  cross-sectional  sample of  tax-exempt 
18.  The following information was provided by  Chris Bumcrot of  Loan Pricing Corp.  and 
gleaned from several issues of Loan Pricing Report, a publication of Loan Pricing Corp. Infor- 
mation about bank practices was also provided by  Steve Woods and Nori Marshall, both of Bank 
of America. 
19.  Another motivation for the sale of loans is the new risk-adjusted capital reserve require- 
ment schedule that goes into full effect in 1992. Under these requirements, in 1992 a bank would 
have to set aside $8, $4 of which must be in stockholder's equity, for every $100 of private loans 
(nongovernment supported or related). These requirements substantially reduce the holding reve- 
nue for a loan and thereby encourage loan sales. 
20.  We thank Chet Ragavan of Merrill-Lynch's Fixed Income Research Department for provid- 
ing the total return data for the Menill-Lynch government master bond index and the mortgage 
master index. 
21.  We are grateful to Julie Friedlander of Lipper Analytical Securities Corp. for supplying the 
quarterly total return on the Lipper General Municipal Bond Funds. We  impute a tax-equivalent 
return for state and municipal securities by  setting the federal tax rate at 46 percent for the years 
1984-86,  40 percent in  1987 and 34 percent in  1988. These are the maximum statutory rates, 
which are applicable for the large banks in our sample. Our imputation does not take into account 
the percentage of interest payments disallowed. Before 1983 all of the interest incurred by a bank 
in acquiring tax-exempt securities could be deducted. In  1983, the tax law was changed to disal- 
low 20 percent of the interest incurred for tax-exempt securities acquired after 1982. The 1986 tax 
law changed the disallowance to 100 percent of the interest incurred for securities acquired after 
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mutual funds. However, it is reasonable to suppose that a bank’s management 
of its tax-exempt portfolio is similar to that of firms specializing in such man- 
agement, otherwise the bank may be better off contracting out for the manage- 
ment of its tax-exempt portfolio.  Because the interest on state and municipal 
bonds is tax-exempt, we incorporate the interest earned on these securities on 
a tax-equivalent basis. 
6.4.2  Model Estimation and Results 
Our econometric model relates the asset shares in asset holding and service 
fee revenue, wi,  to the asset portfolio share, s,,  the log of the branching char- 
acteristics variable a, the logs of outputs (y,,  . . . ,  y8),  and the logs of inputs 
(x,, x,,  xJ,  as given in equations (8) and (9). 
Before estimating the model we checked for influential observations by run- 
ning a sequence of regression diagnostics on an aggregate loan equation with 
identical functional form to the equations in our more detailed  system. We 
isolated and deleted observations that were tagged as influential via a heuristic 
test on the size of the diagonal element of the “hat” matrix corresponding to 
the observation,  using  the Belsley,  Kuh, and Welsch (1980) recommended 
cutoff. This test is oriented toward finding observations with unusual leverage 
on the parameter estimates because of  the values of their exogenous variables. 
An examination of this list of banks revealed that a number were in one of two 
categories: The first category is banks that  were or later became troubled, 
including Continental Illinois in  1984, and a collection of Texas, California, 
and Florida Banks in each of  the five years.  The second  category included 
U.S.  subsidiaries  of  foreign  banks,  particularly  Japanese  banks  located  in 
New York and California.  A third, small category included what were appar- 
ently savings and loans that had joined the Federal Reserve System. An ex- 
amination of the loan holding revenue  share for the set of  “hat” influential 
banks also revealed some extreme values, including values less than zero and 
greater than one. Although our inclusion of provisions for loan losses as part 
of  the loan return means that these values are not ruled out, they were rare 
outliers in our sample. All told, the diagnostic filter reduced our sample size 
by  approximately  10 percent.  A handful  of observations were also deleted 
because of excessively large studentized residuals; that is, they had excessive 
influence on the model fit. 
Our sample size was reduced somewhat further by the fact that some banks 
in the sample had no assets at all in certain categories, making them impos- 
sible for our translog model to handle.,,  This resulted in a further reduction in 
sample size of  about 5 percent.  We  present  statistics for selected  variables 
from the full and edited samples in table 6.2. 
We estimated the system of  equations (8) for each of the years 1984-88 by 
22. Using the  generalized quadratic functional form recently discovered by  Diewert (1992) 
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the iterative seemingly unrelated regressions method, dropping without loss 
of generality equation (9) because of the singularity of the covariance matrix 
of the disturbances arising from the fact that X;  =  ,E,  = 0. The parameter of 
greatest interest to us is 4, the coefficient of  the portfolio shares sI. Without 
exception, I$  is estimated very precisely, and exhibits substantial stability over 
the period, rising from 1984 to 1985, a very profitable year for this group of 
banks, then declining through 1986 to a low in 1987, a year characterized by 
a profit squeeze, and rebounding in  1988.23  In general, we expected the dis- 
tance function derived economic shares to be positively related to the log of 
own output, because this is related to the convexity of the translog functional 
form we  used. Our expectations were met for all the loan categories except 
other loans and leases, y,,  whose own elasticities were positive but insignifi- 
cant in  1984, negative and significant in  1985, negative and insignificant in 
1986, positive and significant in  1987, and negative and insignificant in  1988. 
The securities share equations in various years  also displayed intermittent 
negative own output elasticities. 
We  did not enforce convexity on the distance function parameters. In light 
of  the fact that the portfolio shares clearly swamped the distance function 
arguments as explanatory variables for the accounting revenue shares, it is 
very unlikely that imposing nonlinear restrictions on the coefficients of these 
variables (convexity constraints) would have appreciably changed the results 
for 4. 
Our estimated aggregate opportunity cost rate is the asset-weighted average 
of the opportunity cost rates of the banks in our full sample, computed as p = 
c$  *  fTA,  where fTA  is the asset-weighted average rate of  total return on assets 
for the sample, and c$ is the estimate of  p/rTA  from our econometric model. In 
table 6.3 we present a comparison of our econometric estimate of the oppor- 
tunity cost rate with several plausible, and relatively easily obtained, alterna- 
tives. These are (1) the 90-day Treasury Bill rate, r,;  (2)  the rate of return on 
assets, FA; (3) the required rate to cover the interest cost of liabilities, rREQ;  and 
(4) the opportunity cost rate generating the proposed UNSO financial services 
imputation. 
The asset-weighted sample mean total return on assets is computed as 
where n indexes banks, and N is the sample size. Rate (2),  the asset-weighted 
sample mean holding return on assets, is computed as 
23.  Our standard error estimates are not corrected for the studentized residual and DFFITS 
sample trimming techniques (defined in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980) we applied to eliminate 
outliers and increase the resistance of our parameter estimates to influential observations. These 
filters truncate the dependent variables of our system, and the precision of  our estimates is there- 
fore somewhat overstated. However, very few observations were affected by these filters, and we 
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Table 6.3  Opportunity Cost Rates Asset-Weighted Means 
Variable Description  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
rm  90-day Treasury  ,0952  .0747  ,0597  ,0578  .0667 
rREp  Required rate  .0818  ,0686  ,0557  .0558  ,0615 
Asset rate  .I123  ,1056  ,0895  ,0696  ,0910  'A 
~TA  Total asset rate  .I223  ,1163  ,1007  ,0824  ,1039 
9  P/r,  ,7628  ,8214  ,6950  ,6065  ,7385 
P  Econometric opportunity cost  ,0933  .0961  .0700  ,0500  ,0767 
poNso  UNSO opportunity cost  ,0970  .0871  .0726  ,0627  ,0762 
Rate (4), the asset-weighted sample mean required rate of return on assets, is 
computed as 
where k,, is the ratio of  reserves-currency  and coin and deposits at Federal 
Reserve banks-to  deposit and other liabilities for the nth bank.24 
Fixler and Zieschang (1991) showed that the imputation scheme used by 
the BEA for allocating uncharged services provided by banks to customers in 
the business and final consumption sectors implicitly takes p = fA.  They also 
argue that the proposed UNSO imputation method implicitly assumes that p 
To  judge which of  these alternatives is closest to our estimated p, we con- 
sider the average absolute difference between our estimate of  p and these al- 
ternatives. We  find that our estimated value of p is closest on average to the p 
given by  the UNSO approach, the average absolute difference being 57 basis 
points, where a basis point is one one-hundredth of an interest rate percentage 
point. In  contrast, the average difference between the 90-day Treasury Bill 
rate and p is 103 basis points; between the fREe  and p it is 149 basis points; 
and between the BEA-determined p and our p the average absolute difference 
is 164 basis points. Thus our analysis suggests that the UNSO approach pro- 
vides a reasonable rule of thumb for the calculation of p.25 
Because it is a determinant of the weights by  which quantity relatives are 
= [fR,,,  + fA]/2. 
24.  k,, is not the same as the legally required reserve ratio for deposits because for many banks 
the currency and coin holdings are amounts necessary for business, and some banks may hold 
excess reserves on deposit at the Federal Reserve. 
25.  It is also worth noting from table 6.3 that the simple  average difference between rm and p 
is positive, with rm  exceeding  p by  substantial amounts in three of  the five years, and staying 
numerically close in the two years when it fell below p. Because rm is a rate on short-duration, 
risk-free assets, this evidence suggests that our estimate of p reflects the higher risk and (presum- 
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averaged to form an index number, p is important to the calculation of output 
quantity indexes. If the overall (aggregate) distance function is translog, as in 
(l),  then, following Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982), we can compute 
the following, exact, period-to-period index number: 
D(xt--l,  at-’, y‘)  D(x‘, a‘, y‘)  I 
Q = [D(xf-l,  af-l  ,  y‘-l)  D(x‘, a‘, yt-1)  l2 
- n8  “c”:-’Y:-’  I  P:Yf 
I  ,  = I  p:-  ‘Y:-  I  lP:YJ 
*=I  r-1  8  - 
where p: = h: - p for assets, and p: = p -  h: for liabilities. These expres- 
sions are the negative of the user cost expressions in (1) and (2); to enable the 
y,  to be always positive, negative user costs are employed. It follows that a 
negative price means that the product is a financial input and that a positive 
price means that the product is a financial output. We find that the financial 
input-output status of the financial products is fairly constant over the exam- 
ined period, regardless of the estimate of the opportunity cost rate. For ex- 
ample, with our econometrically estimated p, there were a total of four finan- 
cial input-output status switches: y, was an input in  1984 and switched to an 
output in 1985; ys switched from an output in 1986 to an input in 1987 and 
remained an input in 1988; and y,  switched from an output in 1986 to an input 
in 1987 and back again to an output in 1988. The other financial products were 
always financial outputs. Interestingly, whenever a product became a financial 
input, the attending price was close to zero. For example, the price of y, was 
4 cents per dollar in 1986, declining to  -0.4  cents per dollar in 1987. This 
small value likely results from the value of  the uncharged-for financial ser- 
vices nearly offsetting the explicit charges. The other values of  p produced 
approximately the same number of financial input-output status switches, and 
these changes were concentrated in ys  and y,. 
The cumulative, chained values of the index (10) and the associated implicit 
price index, computed under alternative opportunity cost estimates, are pre- 
sented for the years 1984-88  in table 6.4. We found that the aggregate output 
of banks increased by approximately 40 percent over the period. In addition, 
it can be seen that our price and output measures are insensitive to the varia- 
tions in the level of p represented by the alternatives we consider. One should 
keep in mind that our yearly sample of banks contains the large banks; that is, 
we consider more than 400 of the top banks measured in total assets from a 
total of (approximately) 13,000 banks. In terms of deposits, our sample of 
banks accounted for 54 percent of total deposits in 1988, and similar magni- 
tudes were encountered in the other years. Because more than  12,000 banks 
accounted  for the remainder of  the deposits, it is likely that some of these 
banks were quite small and that some even experienced negative growth. Cou- 
pling this fact with the decline in the number of banks over the period, approx- 
imately 9 percent, it is quite likely that industry growth was smaller than 40 241  User Costs and the Real Output of  Banks 
Table 6.4  Price and Quantity Indexes under Alternative Opportunity 
Cost Rates 
Variable Description  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Aggregate Output Quantity Indexes 
r,  90-day Treasury  100.00  110.40  123.19  133.36  140.70 
rRtP  Required rate  100.00  110.61  123.46  133.59  140.92 
rA  Asset rate  100.00  109.83  122.24  132.85  140.31 
P  Econometric  100.00  110.16  122.80  133.01  140.26 
puNs0  UNSO opportunity cost  100.00  110.24  122.87  133.24  140.63 
Aggregate (Implicit) Output Price Indexes 
r,  90-day Treasury  100.00  110.20  102.60  76.25  96.16 
rRE,  Required rate  100.00  109.99  102.37  76.12  96.02 
rA  Asset rate  100.00  110.77  103.39  76.55  96.43 
P  Econometric  100.00  110.44  102.92  76.46  96.47 
puNs0  UNSO opportunity cost  100.00  110.37  102.86  76.33  96.21 
opportunity cost 
opportunity cost 
percent. On the other hand, our output growth result compares well with the 
output growth computed in Berger and Humphrey (chap. 7, this vol.) for the 
same banks during the same period. 
Of  note in our output trend is the substantial, double-digit growth in the 
years  1984 and  1985. This may be explained by  the relatively large interest 
rate margins (measured as r, -  r,,,) of these years. The interest rate margin 
was 370 basis points in 1985 and fell to 138 basis points in 1987. Moreover, 
in the years beginning with  1985 there were increases in loan loss reserves, 
largely for loans to less developed countries and energy-related loans in the 
Southwest. These developments tended to push the return on assets down. We 
see correspondingly that the implicit output price indexes began to fall in 1986. 
6.5  Conclusion 
Hancock’s (1985a,  1985b, 1986) studies of  commercial banking showed 
how  financial firms could be analyzed within a traditional neoclassical pro- 
duction model, in concert with the user cost of money innovation of Donovan 
(1978) and Barnett (1978). Fixler (1988) has shown that Hancock’s translog 
restricted profit function,  in concert with  her constructed user  cost prices, 
underlies a practical framework for price and output measurement for finan- 
cial firms based on the Tornqvist (or other superlative) index number. The 
chief issue in the user cost framework, as in other applications in investment 
and durable consumption goods, is obtaining reliable estimates of the com- 
ponents of the user cost price. Our focus here has been on the opportunity cost 242  Dennis J. Fixler and Kimberly D. Zieschang 
rate, the single truly unobservable item in the user cost formula. We approach 
the estimation of the opportunity cost rate as a shadow price problem, and in 
contrast with Hancock, characterize technology in terms of  its production or 
distance function instead of  its restricted profit function. We estimate the rel- 
evant parameters of  the distance function, under the assumption that the op- 
portunity cost rate is an unknown, constant fraction of the rate of total return 
on assets. We find that our econometric estimate of  the opportunity cost rate 
is in the same range as several rule-of-thumb estimates, including the return 
on assets, the required rate of return on assets, and the 90-day Treasury Bill 
rate. However, it  is tightly estimated  and significantly different from all of 
them. 
Using  our estimate of  the opportunity  cost rate,  we construct  Tornqvist 
quantity indexes for the years  1984-88.  Over the period output grew 40 per- 
cent with double-digit output growth in the years 1984 and 1985. At first blush 
one might suppose that our output index is sensitive to the opportunity cost of 
money used. In fact, our superlative quantity index is shown to be insensitive 
to the variations in the opportunity cost rate given by the rule-of-thumb esti- 
mates.  The importance of  this finding to the production of price and (gross) 
output quantity-index numbers is that it establishes the commonsense rules of 
thumb as cheaper substitutes  for the  more  expensive  econometrically  esti- 
mated opportunity cost of money. 
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